diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'credential-store.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | credential-store.c | 157 |
1 files changed, 157 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/credential-store.c b/credential-store.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..26f7589a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/credential-store.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +#include "cache.h" +#include "credential.h" +#include "string-list.h" +#include "parse-options.h" + +static struct lock_file credential_lock; + +static void parse_credential_file(const char *fn, + struct credential *c, + void (*match_cb)(struct credential *), + void (*other_cb)(struct strbuf *)) +{ + FILE *fh; + struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT; + struct credential entry = CREDENTIAL_INIT; + + fh = fopen(fn, "r"); + if (!fh) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + die_errno("unable to open %s", fn); + return; + } + + while (strbuf_getline(&line, fh, '\n') != EOF) { + credential_from_url(&entry, line.buf); + if (entry.username && entry.password && + credential_match(c, &entry)) { + if (match_cb) { + match_cb(&entry); + break; + } + } + else if (other_cb) + other_cb(&line); + } + + credential_clear(&entry); + strbuf_release(&line); + fclose(fh); +} + +static void print_entry(struct credential *c) +{ + printf("username=%s\n", c->username); + printf("password=%s\n", c->password); +} + +static void print_line(struct strbuf *buf) +{ + strbuf_addch(buf, '\n'); + write_or_die(credential_lock.fd, buf->buf, buf->len); +} + +static void rewrite_credential_file(const char *fn, struct credential *c, + struct strbuf *extra) +{ + if (hold_lock_file_for_update(&credential_lock, fn, 0) < 0) + die_errno("unable to get credential storage lock"); + if (extra) + print_line(extra); + parse_credential_file(fn, c, NULL, print_line); + if (commit_lock_file(&credential_lock) < 0) + die_errno("unable to commit credential store"); +} + +static void store_credential(const char *fn, struct credential *c) +{ + struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; + + /* + * Sanity check that what we are storing is actually sensible. + * In particular, we can't make a URL without a protocol field. + * Without either a host or pathname (depending on the scheme), + * we have no primary key. And without a username and password, + * we are not actually storing a credential. + */ + if (!c->protocol || !(c->host || c->path) || + !c->username || !c->password) + return; + + strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s://", c->protocol); + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->username, 1); + strbuf_addch(&buf, ':'); + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->password, 1); + strbuf_addch(&buf, '@'); + if (c->host) + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->host, 1); + if (c->path) { + strbuf_addch(&buf, '/'); + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->path, 0); + } + + rewrite_credential_file(fn, c, &buf); + strbuf_release(&buf); +} + +static void remove_credential(const char *fn, struct credential *c) +{ + /* + * Sanity check that we actually have something to match + * against. The input we get is a restrictive pattern, + * so technically a blank credential means "erase everything". + * But it is too easy to accidentally send this, since it is equivalent + * to empty input. So explicitly disallow it, and require that the + * pattern have some actual content to match. + */ + if (c->protocol || c->host || c->path || c->username) + rewrite_credential_file(fn, c, NULL); +} + +static int lookup_credential(const char *fn, struct credential *c) +{ + parse_credential_file(fn, c, print_entry, NULL); + return c->username && c->password; +} + +int main(int argc, const char **argv) +{ + const char * const usage[] = { + "git credential-store [options] <action>", + NULL + }; + const char *op; + struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT; + char *file = NULL; + struct option options[] = { + OPT_STRING(0, "file", &file, "path", + "fetch and store credentials in <path>"), + OPT_END() + }; + + umask(077); + + argc = parse_options(argc, argv, NULL, options, usage, 0); + if (argc != 1) + usage_with_options(usage, options); + op = argv[0]; + + if (!file) + file = expand_user_path("~/.git-credentials"); + if (!file) + die("unable to set up default path; use --file"); + + if (credential_read(&c, stdin) < 0) + die("unable to read credential"); + + if (!strcmp(op, "get")) + lookup_credential(file, &c); + else if (!strcmp(op, "erase")) + remove_credential(file, &c); + else if (!strcmp(op, "store")) + store_credential(file, &c); + else + ; /* Ignore unknown operation. */ + + return 0; +} |