diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'path.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | path.c | 273 |
1 files changed, 230 insertions, 43 deletions
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * which is what it's designed for. */ #include "cache.h" +#include "strbuf.h" static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/"; @@ -139,6 +140,101 @@ int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template) return mkstemp(path); } +/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */ +int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len) +{ + const char *tmp; + size_t n; + + tmp = getenv("TMPDIR"); + if (!tmp) + tmp = "/tmp"; + n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template); + if (len <= n) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + return mkstemps(path, suffix_len); +} + +/* Adapted from libiberty's mkstemp.c. */ + +#undef TMP_MAX +#define TMP_MAX 16384 + +int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode) +{ + static const char letters[] = + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" + "0123456789"; + static const int num_letters = 62; + uint64_t value; + struct timeval tv; + char *template; + size_t len; + int fd, count; + + len = strlen(pattern); + + if (len < 6 + suffix_len) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (strncmp(&pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len], "XXXXXX", 6)) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + /* + * Replace pattern's XXXXXX characters with randomness. + * Try TMP_MAX different filenames. + */ + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + value = ((size_t)(tv.tv_usec << 16)) ^ tv.tv_sec ^ getpid(); + template = &pattern[len - 6 - suffix_len]; + for (count = 0; count < TMP_MAX; ++count) { + uint64_t v = value; + /* Fill in the random bits. */ + template[0] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + template[1] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + template[2] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + template[3] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + template[4] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + template[5] = letters[v % num_letters]; v /= num_letters; + + fd = open(pattern, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR, mode); + if (fd > 0) + return fd; + /* + * Fatal error (EPERM, ENOSPC etc). + * It doesn't make sense to loop. + */ + if (errno != EEXIST) + break; + /* + * This is a random value. It is only necessary that + * the next TMP_MAX values generated by adding 7777 to + * VALUE are different with (module 2^32). + */ + value += 7777; + } + /* We return the null string if we can't find a unique file name. */ + pattern[0] = '\0'; + return -1; +} + +int git_mkstemp_mode(char *pattern, int mode) +{ + /* mkstemp is just mkstemps with no suffix */ + return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, 0, mode); +} + +int gitmkstemps(char *pattern, int suffix_len) +{ + return git_mkstemps_mode(pattern, suffix_len, 0600); +} int validate_headref(const char *path) { @@ -191,43 +287,49 @@ int validate_headref(const char *path) return -1; } -static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz) +static struct passwd *getpw_str(const char *username, size_t len) { struct passwd *pw; - char *slash; - int len, baselen; + char *username_z = xmalloc(len + 1); + memcpy(username_z, username, len); + username_z[len] = '\0'; + pw = getpwnam(username_z); + free(username_z); + return pw; +} - if (!path || path[0] != '~') - return NULL; - path++; - slash = strchr(path, '/'); - if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) { - pw = getpwuid(getuid()); - } - else { - if (slash) { - *slash = 0; - pw = getpwnam(path); - *slash = '/'; +/* + * Return a string with ~ and ~user expanded via getpw*. If buf != NULL, + * then it is a newly allocated string. Returns NULL on getpw failure or + * if path is NULL. + */ +char *expand_user_path(const char *path) +{ + struct strbuf user_path = STRBUF_INIT; + const char *first_slash = strchrnul(path, '/'); + const char *to_copy = path; + + if (path == NULL) + goto return_null; + if (path[0] == '~') { + const char *username = path + 1; + size_t username_len = first_slash - username; + if (username_len == 0) { + const char *home = getenv("HOME"); + strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home)); + } else { + struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len); + if (!pw) + goto return_null; + strbuf_add(&user_path, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir)); } - else - pw = getpwnam(path); + to_copy = first_slash; } - if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir)) - return NULL; - baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir); - memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen); - while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) { - buf[baselen-1] = 0; - baselen--; - } - if (slash && slash[1]) { - len = strlen(slash); - if (sz <= baselen + len) - return NULL; - memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1); - } - return buf; + strbuf_add(&user_path, to_copy, strlen(to_copy)); + return strbuf_detach(&user_path, NULL); +return_null: + strbuf_release(&user_path); + return NULL; } /* @@ -275,8 +377,18 @@ char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict) if (PATH_MAX <= len) return NULL; if (path[0] == '~') { - if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX)) + char *newpath = expand_user_path(path); + if (!newpath || (PATH_MAX - 10 < strlen(newpath))) { + free(newpath); return NULL; + } + /* + * Copy back into the static buffer. A pity + * since newpath was not bounded, but other + * branches of the if are limited by PATH_MAX + * anyway. + */ + strcpy(used_path, newpath); free(newpath); strcpy(validated_path, path); path = used_path; } @@ -303,7 +415,7 @@ char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict) if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 && validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) { - setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1); + set_git_dir("."); check_repository_format(); return path; } @@ -361,17 +473,38 @@ int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode) const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base) { static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1]; - int baselen; - if (!base) - return abs; - baselen = strlen(base); - if (prefixcmp(abs, base)) + int i = 0, j = 0; + + if (!base || !base[0]) return abs; - if (abs[baselen] == '/') - baselen++; - else if (base[baselen - 1] != '/') + while (base[i]) { + if (is_dir_sep(base[i])) { + if (!is_dir_sep(abs[j])) + return abs; + while (is_dir_sep(base[i])) + i++; + while (is_dir_sep(abs[j])) + j++; + continue; + } else if (abs[j] != base[i]) { + return abs; + } + i++; + j++; + } + if ( + /* "/foo" is a prefix of "/foo" */ + abs[j] && + /* "/foo" is not a prefix of "/foobar" */ + !is_dir_sep(base[i-1]) && !is_dir_sep(abs[j]) + ) return abs; - strcpy(buf, abs + baselen); + while (is_dir_sep(abs[j])) + j++; + if (!abs[j]) + strcpy(buf, "."); + else + strcpy(buf, abs + j); return buf; } @@ -548,3 +681,57 @@ char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix) return NULL; return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len)); } + +int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p) +{ + int sl, ndot; + + /* + * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA + * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo() + * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization. + * + * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to + * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening + * non-dot character. + */ + if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~')) + return -1; + sl = 1; ndot = 0; + p++; + + while (1) { + char ch = *p++; + if (sl) { + if (ch == '.') + ndot++; + else if (ch == '/') { + if (ndot < 3) + /* reject //, /./ and /../ */ + return -1; + ndot = 0; + } + else if (ch == 0) { + if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3) + /* reject /.$ and /..$ */ + return -1; + return 0; + } + else + sl = ndot = 0; + } + else if (ch == 0) + return 0; + else if (ch == '/') { + sl = 1; + ndot = 0; + } + } +} + +int offset_1st_component(const char *path) +{ + if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path)) + return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]); + return is_dir_sep(path[0]); +} |