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into for-next
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The SHA-512 NEON works just fine under big endian, so remove the Kconfig
condition preventing it from being selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is
set.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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This tweaks the SHA-1 NEON code slightly so it works correctly under big
endian, and removes the Kconfig condition preventing it from being
selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is set.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djbw/dmaengine
Pull dmaengine updates from Dan Williams:
"Even though this has fixes marked for -stable, given the size and the
needed conflict resolutions this is 3.18-rc1/merge-window material.
These patches have been languishing in my tree for a long while. The
fact that I do not have the time to do proper/prompt maintenance of
this tree is a primary factor in the decision to step down as
dmaengine maintainer. That and the fact that the bulk of drivers/dma/
activity is going through Vinod these days.
The net_dma removal has not been in -next. It has developed simple
conflicts against mainline and net-next (for-3.18).
Continuing thanks to Vinod for staying on top of drivers/dma/.
Summary:
1/ Step down as dmaengine maintainer see commit 08223d80df38
"dmaengine maintainer update"
2/ Removal of net_dma, as it has been marked 'broken' since 3.13
(commit 77873803363c "net_dma: mark broken"), without reports of
performance regression.
3/ Miscellaneous fixes"
* tag 'dmaengine-3.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djbw/dmaengine:
net: make tcp_cleanup_rbuf private
net_dma: revert 'copied_early'
net_dma: simple removal
dmaengine maintainer update
dmatest: prevent memory leakage on error path in thread
ioat: Use time_before_jiffies()
dmaengine: fix xor sources continuation
dma: mv_xor: Rename __mv_xor_slot_cleanup() to mv_xor_slot_cleanup()
dma: mv_xor: Remove all callers of mv_xor_slot_cleanup()
dma: mv_xor: Remove unneeded mv_xor_clean_completed_slots() call
ioat: Use pci_enable_msix_exact() instead of pci_enable_msix()
drivers: dma: Include appropriate header file in dca.c
drivers: dma: Mark functions as static in dma_v3.c
dma: mv_xor: Add DMA API error checks
ioat/dca: Use dev_is_pci() to check whether it is pci device
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the partial xor result must be kept until the next
tx is generated.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xuelin Shi <xuelin.shi@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the newly added drbg generator so that it actually works on
32-bit machines. Previously the code was only tested on 64-bit and on
32-bit it overflowed and simply doesn't work"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle
crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems"
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The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
removed in previous patches.
Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.
Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert as it appears that the PE
file wrapper size gets rounded up to the nearest 8.
The debugging output looks like this:
PEFILE: ==> verify_pefile_signature()
PEFILE: ==> pefile_parse_binary()
PEFILE: checksum @ 110
PEFILE: header size = 200
PEFILE: cert = 968 @547be0 [68 09 00 00 00 02 02 00 30 82 09 56 ]
PEFILE: sig wrapper = { 968, 200, 2 }
PEFILE: Signature data not PKCS#7
The wrapper is the first 8 bytes of the hex dump inside []. This indicates a
length of 0x968 bytes, including the wrapper header - so 0x960 bytes of
payload.
The ASN.1 wrapper begins [ ... 30 82 09 56 ]. That indicates an object of size
0x956 - a four byte discrepency, presumably just padding for alignment
purposes.
So we just check that the ASN.1 container is no bigger than the payload and
reduce the recorded size appropriately.
Whilst we're at it, allow shorter PKCS#7 objects that manage to squeeze within
127 or 255 bytes. It's just about conceivable if no X.509 certs are included
in the PKCS#7 message.
Reported-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The length of the name of an asymmetric key subtype must be stored in struct
asymmetric_key_subtype::name_len so that it can be matched by a search for
"<subkey_name>:<partial_fingerprint>". Fix the public_key subtype to have
name_len set.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Now with 64bit bzImage and kexec tools, we support ramdisk that size is
bigger than 2g, as we could put it above 4G.
Found compressed initramfs image could not be decompressed properly. It
turns out that image length is int during decompress detection, and it
will become < 0 when length is more than 2G. Furthermore, during
decompressing len as int is used for inbuf count, that has problem too.
Change len to long, that should be ok as on 32 bit platform long is
32bits.
Tested with following compressed initramfs image as root with kexec.
gzip, bzip2, xz, lzma, lzop, lz4.
run time for populate_rootfs():
size name Nehalem-EX Westmere-EX Ivybridge-EX
9034400256 root_img : 26s 24s 30s
3561095057 root_img.lz4 : 28s 27s 27s
3459554629 root_img.lzo : 29s 29s 28s
3219399480 root_img.gz : 64s 62s 49s
2251594592 root_img.xz : 262s 260s 183s
2226366598 root_img.lzma: 386s 376s 277s
2901482513 root_img.bz2 : 635s 599s
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: "Daniel M. Weeks" <dan@danweeks.net>
Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this release:
- PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
- appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
- bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
KEYS: revert encrypted key change
ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
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Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() so that PKCS#7 can use it if
compiled as a module.
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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X.509 certificate issuer and subject fields are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
and so their existence needn't be tested for. They are guaranteed to end up
with an empty string if the name material has nothing we can use (see
x509_fabricate_name()).
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same
thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop
the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general.
Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to
better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an
X.509 cert.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated
strings passing in as it can work that out for itself.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Fixes the following sparse warnings:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning:
symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather
than relying on getting it through other headers.
Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-)
Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that...
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by
builtin keys on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter
'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch
Changelog v7:
- rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a
particular key on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the
specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch.
Changelog:
- support for builtin x509 public keys only
- export "asymmetric_keyid_match"
- remove ifndefs MODULE
- rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(),
making partial ID string match a separate function.
This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code. asymmetric_key_match()
allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be
undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first
checks for matching spec and then for its value.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.
This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
Changelog v6:
- on error free key - Dmitry
- validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry
- formatting cleanup
Changelog:
- define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
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Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker.
This provides the following facility:
(1) Extract the signature from the PE file. This is a PKCS#7 message
containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file.
(2) Digest the signed parts of the file.
(3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message.
(4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate
whether it was matched by a trusted key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the
PKCS#7 signed content.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose
instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing"
data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed
content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically
SHA256).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7
signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got
something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later
patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel.
The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated
kernels only if so configured.
The changes provide the following facilities:
(1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data
content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data
signatures.
(2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates
available in the message.
(3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that:
(a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed
itself, and:
(b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent'
certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter.
(4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted
keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted
certificates signed the intersection point in the chain.
(5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a
PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its
data content into the key.
Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches
already committed to this branch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser. It is given a non-detached
PKCS#7 message as payload:
keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7
The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and
then stripped off. If successful, the key can be read, which will give the
data content of the PKCS#7 message.
A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile.
This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading. The key3.x509
file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and
converted to DER form:
openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509
###############################################################################
#
# Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice
#
# openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs
$(RM) $@
openssl smime -sign \
-signer key2.x509 \
-inkey key2.priv \
-signer key4.x509 \
-inkey key4.priv \
-in stuff.txt \
-certfile certs \
-out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach
openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -print_certs -noout
openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -i >out
stuff.txt:
echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt
certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509
cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@
###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
# openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509
openssl x509 \
-req -in key2.x509_unsigned \
-out key2.x509 \
-extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \
-CA key1.x509 \
-CAkey key1.priv \
-CAcreateserial
key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
-batch -outform PEM \
-config key2.genkey \
-keyout key2.priv \
-out key2.x509_unsigned
key2.genkey:
@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
@echo >$@ "[ req ]"
@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2"
@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
# openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509
#
###############################################################################
key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509
openssl x509 \
-req -in key1.x509_unsigned \
-out key1.x509 \
-extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \
-CA key4.x509 \
-CAkey key4.priv \
-CAcreateserial
key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
-batch -outform PEM \
-config key1.genkey \
-keyout key1.priv \
-out key1.x509_unsigned
key1.genkey:
@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
@echo >$@ "[ req ]"
@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1"
@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
# openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509
#
###############################################################################
key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509
openssl x509 \
-req -in key4.x509_unsigned \
-out key4.x509 \
-extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \
-CA key3.x509 \
-CAkey key3.priv \
-CAcreateserial
key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
-batch -outform PEM \
-config key4.genkey \
-keyout key4.priv \
-out key4.x509_unsigned
key4.genkey:
@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
@echo >$@ "[ req ]"
@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4"
@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
# openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509
#
###############################################################################
key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
-batch -x509 -outform PEM \
-config key3.genkey \
-keyout key3.priv \
-out key3.x509
key3.genkey:
@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
@echo >$@ "[ req ]"
@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3"
@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
@echo >>$@
@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
clean:
$(RM) *~
$(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
message and a set of keys that we already know and trust.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify
fails, we reject the whole lot.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with
it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that
chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the
public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of
RFC 2315.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an
X.509 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond
with those in struct key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse
hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked
to retain the new key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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Pull ARM updates from Russell King:
"Included in this update:
- perf updates from Will Deacon:
The main changes are callchain stability fixes from Jean Pihet and
event mapping and PMU name rework from Mark Rutland
The latter is preparatory work for enabling some code re-use with
arm64 in the future.
- updates for nommu from Uwe Kleine-König:
Two different fixes for the same problem making some ARM nommu
configurations not boot since 3.6-rc1. The problem is that
user_addr_max returned the biggest available RAM address which
makes some copy_from_user variants fail to read from XIP memory.
- deprecate legacy OMAP DMA API, in preparation for it's removal.
The popular drivers have been converted over, leaving a very small
number of rarely used drivers, which hopefully can be converted
during the next cycle with a bit more visibility (and hopefully
people popping out of the woodwork to help test)
- more tweaks for BE systems, particularly with the kernel image
format. In connection with this, I've cleaned up the way we
generate the linker script for the decompressor.
- removal of hard-coded assumptions of the kernel stack size, making
everywhere depend on the value of THREAD_SIZE_ORDER.
- MCPM updates from Nicolas Pitre.
- Make it easier for proper CPU part number checks (which should
always include the vendor field).
- Assembly code optimisation - use the "bx" instruction when
returning from a function on ARMv6+ rather than "mov pc, reg".
- Save the last kernel misaligned fault location and report it via
the procfs alignment file.
- Clean up the way we create the initial stack frame, which is a
repeated pattern in several different locations.
- Support for 8-byte get_user(), needed for some DRM implementations.
- mcs locking from Will Deacon.
- Save and restore a few more Cortex-A9 registers (for errata
workarounds)
- Fix various aspects of the SWP emulation, and the ELF hwcap for the
SWP instruction.
- Update LPAE logic for pte_write and pmd_write to make it more
correct.
- Support for Broadcom Brahma15 CPU cores.
- ARM assembly crypto updates from Ard Biesheuvel"
* 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: (53 commits)
ARM: add comments to the early page table remap code
ARM: 8122/1: smp_scu: enable SCU standby support
ARM: 8121/1: smp_scu: use macro for SCU enable bit
ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementation
ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementation
ARM: 8118/1: crypto: sha1/make use of common SHA-1 structures
ARM: 8113/1: remove remaining definitions of PLAT_PHYS_OFFSET from <mach/memory.h>
ARM: 8111/1: Enable erratum 798181 for Broadcom Brahma-B15
ARM: 8110/1: do CPU-specific init for Broadcom Brahma15 cores
ARM: 8109/1: mm: Modify pte_write and pmd_write logic for LPAE
ARM: 8108/1: mm: Introduce {pte,pmd}_isset and {pte,pmd}_isclear
ARM: hwcap: disable HWCAP_SWP if the CPU advertises it has exclusives
ARM: SWP emulation: only initialise on ARMv7 CPUs
ARM: SWP emulation: always enable when SMP is enabled
ARM: 8103/1: save/restore Cortex-A9 CP15 registers on suspend/resume
ARM: 8098/1: mcs lock: implement wfe-based polling for MCS locking
ARM: 8091/2: add get_user() support for 8 byte types
ARM: 8097/1: unistd.h: relocate comments back to place
ARM: 8096/1: Describe required sort order for textofs-y (TEXT_OFFSET)
ARM: 8090/1: add revision info for PL310 errata 588369 and 727915
...
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This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-512 and SHA-384
algorithms.
tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha512-generic vs sha512-neon-asm:
block-size bytes/update old-vs-new
16 16 2.99x
64 16 2.67x
64 64 3.00x
256 16 2.64x
256 64 3.06x
256 256 3.33x
1024 16 2.53x
1024 256 3.39x
1024 1024 3.52x
2048 16 2.50x
2048 256 3.41x
2048 1024 3.54x
2048 2048 3.57x
4096 16 2.49x
4096 256 3.42x
4096 1024 3.56x
4096 4096 3.59x
8192 16 2.48x
8192 256 3.42x
8192 1024 3.56x
8192 4096 3.60x
8192 8192 3.60x
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-1 algorithm.
tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha1-arm-asm vs sha1-neon-asm:
block-size bytes/update old-vs-new
16 16 1.04x
64 16 1.02x
64 64 1.05x
256 16 1.03x
256 64 1.04x
256 256 1.30x
1024 16 1.03x
1024 256 1.36x
1024 1024 1.52x
2048 16 1.03x
2048 256 1.39x
2048 1024 1.55x
2048 2048 1.59x
4096 16 1.03x
4096 256 1.40x
4096 1024 1.57x
4096 4096 1.62x
8192 16 1.03x
8192 256 1.40x
8192 1024 1.58x
8192 4096 1.63x
8192 8192 1.63x
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
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Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
- CTR(AES) optimisation on x86_64 using "by8" AVX.
- arm64 support to ccp
- Intel QAT crypto driver
- Qualcomm crypto engine driver
- x86-64 assembly optimisation for 3DES
- CTR(3DES) speed test
- move FIPS panic from module.c so that it only triggers on crypto
modules
- SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (drbg).
- more test vectors for ghash.
- tweak self tests to catch partial block bugs.
- misc fixes.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (94 commits)
crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytes
crypto: ccp - Do not sign extend input data to CCP
crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error strings
crypto: atmel-tdes - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
crypto: atmel-sha - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk tests
crypto: qat - Fixed SKU1 dev issue
crypto: qat - Use hweight for bit counting
crypto: qat - Updated print outputs
crypto: qat - change ae_num to ae_id
crypto: qat - change slice->regions to slice->region
crypto: qat - use min_t macro
crypto: qat - remove unnecessary parentheses
crypto: qat - remove unneeded header
crypto: qat - checkpatch blank lines
crypto: qat - remove unnecessary return codes
crypto: Resolve shadow warnings
crypto: ccp - Remove "select OF" from Kconfig
crypto: caam - fix DECO RSR polling
crypto: qce - Let 'DEV_QCE' depend on both HAS_DMA and HAS_IOMEM
...
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The function drbg_generate_long slices the request into 2**16 byte
or smaller chunks. However, the loop, however invokes the random number
generation function with zero bytes when the request size is a multiple
of 2**16 bytes. The fix prevents zero bytes requests.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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There are a few missing spaces in the error text strings for
drbg_cavs_test, trivial fix.
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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