From 2e45354645f77e83fe3832f150acdcfeff45f44c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 11:42:56 +0300
Subject: VMCI: integer overflow in vmci_datagram_dispatch()
This is untrusted user data from vmci_host_do_send_datagram() so the
VMCI_DG_SIZE() macro can have an integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
(limited to 'drivers/misc/vmw_vmci')
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c
index f3cdd904fe4d..822665245588 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c
@@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ int vmci_datagram_dispatch(u32 context_id,
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vmci_datagram) != 24);
- if (VMCI_DG_SIZE(dg) > VMCI_MAX_DG_SIZE) {
+ if (dg->payload_size > VMCI_MAX_DG_SIZE ||
+ VMCI_DG_SIZE(dg) > VMCI_MAX_DG_SIZE) {
pr_devel("Payload (size=%llu bytes) too big to send\n",
(unsigned long long)dg->payload_size);
return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
--
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